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Substantive Assertions Before
and After the 2014 Amendment of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
Floralynn Einesman†

Introduction
There are several federal rules of evidence that the legal community
often overlooks or misapplies. Two such rules are Federal Rule of
Evidence 806, Impeaching a Hearsay Declarant, and Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i),
Non-Hearsay Use of Prior Consistent Statements. In 2014, the Committee on Rules expanded the non-hearsay category of admissible prior
consistent statements with Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) to include any statements
counsel uses to rehabilitate a declarant’s credibility after that credibility
has been attacked.1 Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) requires that a declarant
testify and be subjected to cross-examination about the prior consistent
statement.2 Under these rules, the time at which the declarant made the
consistent statement, and her reason for making it are critical.
When the declarant does not testify, however, under Rule 806
opposing counsel may still attack the declarant’s credibility.3 Under these
circumstances, it is often challenging to determine the evidence that
counsel may use to impeach, and, later, to rehabilitate the credibility of
the non-testifying declarant. Moreover, lawyers and judges frequently
conflate the two uses of prior consistent statements—non-hearsay
†
B.A., McGill University; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Floralynn
Einesman is the Associate Dean of Experiential Learning and Professor of Law at
California Western School of Law, San Diego. The author wishes to thank Matthew
Bertolucci for outstanding research and editing support. Special thanks to colleague
Mario Conte whose love of Evidence law inspired this Article and who helped
enormously by patiently reading several drafts and consistently offering valuable
feedback.
1
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) advisory committee note to 2014 amendment.
2
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
3
FED. R. EVID. 806.
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substantive evidence with impeachment-credibility evidence. Through
the examination and analysis of two recent federal cases, United States
v. Cotton4 and United States v. Ledbetter,5 this Article attempts to shed
light on the complexities and proper application of these two rules of
evidence.

I. The Rules of Hearsay
The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of a hearsay
statement at trial.6 Hearsay is defined under Rule 801 as “[a] statement
that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial
or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.”7 The declarant is “the person who made
the statement.”8
The rules exempt certain statements from hearsay.9 These exemptions
are classified as non-hearsay, and include a statement which was made
by an opposing party either in an individual or representative capacity,10
or a statement that an opposing party manifested that he adopted or
believed to be true.11
The rules also declare that the following out-of-court statements are
not hearsay: a statement offered against a party which was either “made
by a person whom the opposing party authorized to make a statement on
the subject,”12 or a statement that “was made by the party’s agent or
employee on a matter within the scope of the agency or employment
relationship during that relationship.”13 Additionally an opposing party’s

4

823 F.3d 430 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 520 (2016).
184 F. Supp. 3d 594 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
6
FED. R. EVID. 802.
7
FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(1)-(2).
8
FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
9
See generally FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A)-(C), 801(d)(2)(A)-(E) (listing types of
statements that are not hearsay).
10
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
11
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
12
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
13
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
5
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co-conspirator’s statement is not hearsay if the co-conspirator made the
statement “during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”14
Finally, the rules exempt from hearsay (1) prior statements that are
“inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony at trial that were made under
the penalty of perjury”;15 (2) prior statements that are “consistent with
the declarant’s direct testimony and that are offered to either rebut a claim
that the declarant recently fabricated or acted from an improper motive
when he testified”;16(3) “to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility when
the declarant’s credibility was attacked on another ground”;17 or (4)
statements of identification made outside of court.18 For any of these
exemptions concerning prior statements, the declarant must testify and
must be subject to cross-examination about the prior statement.19
Additionally, multiple exceptions to the rule against hearsay permit
the introduction of out-of-court statements to prove the truth of the
statement’s assertion.20 Irrespective of whether the declarant is available
to testify or not, Rule 803 allows such out-of-court statements as present
sense impressions;21 excited utterances;22 statements of then-existing
mental, emotional or physical condition;23 statements made for medical
diagnosis;24 and business records.25 If the declarant is deemed unavailable
to testify,26 Rule 804 exceptions permit the introduction of a declarant’s
former testimony,27 and the introduction of any existing dying declara-

14

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
16
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
17
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii).
18
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
19
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
20
See generally FED. R. EVID. 803-804 (listing exceptions to the rule against
hearsay).
21
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
22
FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
23
FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
24
FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
25
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
26
FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (listing the criteria for being deemed unavailable).
27
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
15
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tion,28 statements against interest29 and statements of personal or family
history.30 Under all of these exemptions and exceptions, the court admits
these statements as substantive proof of the statement’s assertion.

II. Impeaching a Hearsay Declarant
Under Rule 806
When a witness testifies, the witness’s credibility is open to challenge.31 Even if a declarant does not testify in person at the hearing, he
may be considered a testifying witness.32 Pursuant to Rule 806, if the
court admits a declarant’s out-of-court statement into evidence under
either a hearsay exemption or exception, the declarant is considered a
testifying witness and her credibility may be attacked and then
supported.33
Rule 806 benefits the party against whom the hearsay statement is
admitted.34 It allows the opposing party to challenge the credibility of
an out-of-court declarant even if that declarant is not present and testi-

28

FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
30
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
31
See generally FED. R. EVID. 607, 608, 609, 613 (listing rules available for use
when impeaching a witness and attacking a witness’s credibility or character).
32
FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee note to 1972 proposed rule (“The declarant
of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness.”).
33
FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee note to 1972 proposed rule (“His
credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and support as though he had
in fact testified.”).
34
See generally Gregory J. Gianoni, Lose the Battle, Win the War: The Use,
Dangers, and Problems Surrounding Rules 806 and 608(B), and How They Can Be
Fixed, 20 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2014-15) (discussing a circuit split in
regard to using Rule 806 to impeach a non-testifying hearsay declarant); Alan D.
Hornstein, On the Horns of an Evidentiary Dilemma: The Intersection of Federal Rules
of Evidence 806 and 608(b), 56 ARK. L. REV. 543 (2003) (explaining the tension
between conflicting policies of Rules 806 and 608(b) when attempting to impeach a
non-testifying declarant); David Sonenshein, Impeaching the Hearsay Declarant, 74
TEMP. L. REV. 163 (2001) (outlining various trial contexts where Rule 608 is used to
impeach an unavailable declarant); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806
and the Problem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 495
(1995) (assessing the deficiencies of Rule 806 in relation to other Federal Rules of
Evidence).
29
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fying in the courtroom. Consequently, opposing counsel may challenge
a declarant’s credibility by attacking the declarant’s character for
truthfulness by reputation or opinion evidence pursuant to Rule 608(a),35
specific instances of conduct pursuant to Rule 608(b)36 and prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609.37 Moreover, counsel may attack the
declarant’s out-of-court statements by introducing the declarant’s prior
inconsistent statement38 or contradiction.39 Additionally, counsel can
attack the declarant’s bias, interest, corruption, coercion, or inability to
perceive, narrate, or recall the event about which he has testified.40
Courts disagree about whether counsel may impeach the non-testifying
declarant’s credibility with extrinsic evidence regarding specific instances
of the declarant’s conduct that implicate Rule 608(b).41 Several courts
have found that admitting extrinsic evidence about specific instances of
conduct involving truthfulness violates Rule 608(b).42 Other courts have
disagreed and have indicated a willingness to admit such evidence.43
35

FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
37
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)-(b).
38
FED. R. EVID. 613; see United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (“A basic
rule of evidence provides that prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the
credibility of a witness.”).
39
United States v. Gilmore, 553 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2009).
40
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984); 27 VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6094 (2d ed. 2017); 4 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 607:1 (7th ed. 2016).
41
See, e.g., United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding
“Rule 806(b)’s ban on extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts” pertaining to an out-ofcourt declarant). But see, e.g., United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 374
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct admissible
when extrinsic evidence is the sole opportunity to introduce such evidence to the jury).
42
Saada, 212 F.3d at 221; accord United States v. Shayota, No. 15-CR-00264LHK, 2016 WL 6093237, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016) (holding Rule 608(b) bars
the introduction of extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes); United States v.
Little, No. CR 08-0244 SBA, 2012 WL 2563796, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 28, 2012)
(holding a declarant may not be impeached with extrinsic evidence if he is unavailable
to testify); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(holding counsel could not use extrinsic evidence to support an attack of the declarant’s
credibility).
43
Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (“By permitting any impeachment evidence that
would be admissible had the declarant testified, Rule 806 renders Rule 608’s
impeachment rules applicable to a declarant’s out-of-court statements . . . . While Rule
608(b) ordinarily does not permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence of specific
36
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III. Rehabilitation
On the other hand, once the credibility of an out-of-court declarant
is attacked,44 the cross examiner must understand that the declarant’s
credibility may be supported by positive evidence.45 If the crossexaminer has challenged the declarant’s character for truthfulness, then
on redirect or rebuttal, counsel may introduce positive evidence about
the declarant’s character for truthfulness in the form of opinion or
reputation testimony.46 If the opponent attacks the witness with the
declarant’s prior inconsistent statement, a court may permit counsel on
redirect or rebuttal to introduce the declarant’s prior statement, which
is consistent with the declarant’s out-of-court statements.47 The witness’s
instances of conduct for [impeachment] purposes . . . extrinsic evidence of specific
instances may be admissible through Rule 806 [because] . . . resort to extrinsic
evidence may be the only means of presenting [impeachment] evidence to the jury.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 570
n.8 (2d Cir. 1988)).
44
ROGER C. PARK & AVIVA ORENSTEIN, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 7:24 (2d
ed. 2015).
45
GRAHAM, supra note 40, at § 607:1 (“Matters brought out on cross-examination
attacking credibility of a witness are generally a proper subject for rehabilitation upon
redirect examination.”).
46
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
47
GRAHAM, supra note 40, at § 801:12; United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 919
(4th Cir. 1997) (“Even before the adoption of the federal rules, this court recognized
that ‘where a cross-examiner has endeavored to discredit a witness by prior inconsistent statements, it is sometimes permissible to offset the damage by showing prior
consistent utterances.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Schoppel v. United States, 270
F.2d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1959)); accord United States v. Hoover, 543 F.3d 448, 454 (8th
Cir. 2008) (holding prior consistent statements could be admitted for rehabilitative
purposes); United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071, 1081 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We agree
that, in appropriate circumstances, prior consistent statements may be admitted for
rehabilitative purposes, even where they do not meet the restrictions of Rule
801(d)(1)(B).”); United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A] prior
consistent statement may be used for rehabilitation when the statement has a probative
force bearing on credibility beyond merely showing repetition. When the prior statement tends to cast doubt on whether the prior inconsistent statement was made or on
whether the impeaching statement is really inconsistent with the trial testimony, its use
for rehabilitation purposes is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Such use
is also permissible when the consistent statement will amplify or clarify the allegedly
inconsistent statement. It matters not whether such use is deemed a permissible type
of rehabilitation or only an invocation of the principle of completeness, though not a
precise use of Rule 106.”); United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106-07
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding the use of a prior consistent statement is admissible for
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poor memory or questionable motive for testifying may lead to rehabilitation with the witness’s prior consistent statements.48 Even though there
is no explicit provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence that authorizes
rehabilitation of the declarant-witness’s credibility by consistent statements, courts permit it under federal common law.49 Relevance standards
under Rules 401, 402 and 403 govern the admissibility of consistent
statements for rehabilitation.50 Under federal common law, the time at
which the declarant made the prior consistent statement is critical.51
rehabilitative purposes); DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 4TH § 2:12, at 152
(2011) (“[I]f the credibility of a witness is impeached by a suggestion that the witness
is an unreliable historian, then evidence that the witness made a prior statement
consistent with the witness’s testimony at trial is relevant to rebut such suggestion and
to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility.”); 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:102, at 647 (4th ed. 2013) (“When a witness is
attacked by a prior inconsistent statement, the attack may be answered by efforts at
refutation or repair. Sometimes the repair proceeds simply by suggesting or proving
that the witness never made the prior statement, or that it was not actually inconsistent
with the testimony. Sometimes the party sponsoring or defending the credibility of the
witness answers the attack in a different way, by proving that the witness has also
made statements that are consistent with her testimony.”) (emphasis added).
48
Liesa L. Richter, Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements: Amending
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(D)(1)(B), 46 CONN. L. REV. 937, 944 (2014) (discussing
the common law evidentiary rules of impeachment and rehabilitation with a prior
consistent statement).
49
Laird C. Kirkpatrick & Christopher B. Mueller, Prior Consistent Statements: The
Dangers of Misinterpreting Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 192, 193 (2016) (discussing the 2014 amendment to
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) and its anticipated effect on the admission of
prior consistent statements); accord Richter, supra note 48, at 943-46 (explaining the
common law evidentiary rules of impeachment and rehabilitation by a prior consistent
statement); Joshua Vanderslice, Case Comment, “Say ‘What’ Again: How Amending
Rule 801(D)(1)(B) Made More Evidence Admissible, 35 REV. LITIG. 161, 162-63
(2016) (“Under the common law temporal priority doctrine, a prior consistent statement
was deemed irrelevant unless it occurred before the origination of the source of the
bias, interest, influence, or incapacity used to impeach. Temporal proximity provided
a rationale for determining relevance when a witness was impeached using a prior inconsistent statement. Since it is unlikely that a witness made two inconsistent statements temporally proximate to one another, a prior consistent statement made near the
time of the prior inconsistent statement decreases the likelihood that the prior inconsistent statement occurred at all. Thus, when a prior consistent statement was used to
refute a prior inconsistent statement, it was only relevant if the witness denied the prior
inconstant statement and it was made near the time the alleged prior inconsistent statement occurred.”) (footnotes omitted).
50
Vanderslice, supra note 49, at 163 (discussing how the Federal Rules of Evidence
preserved the common law rules for the admission of a prior consistent statement).
51
Id. at 162-63.

8
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IV. Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii):
Consistent Statements as Substantive Evidence
Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) states that if a declarant testifies and is subject
to cross examination about a prior statement, the declarant’s out-of-court
statement is not hearsay when the consistent statement is offered to rebut
a cross-examiner’s claim of recent fabrication, improper influence, or
motive on declarant’s part.52 The court may admit this evidence as
substantive proof of the declarant’s assertion,53 not merely as
rehabilitation-credibility evidence. The Supreme Court, however, has
ruled that a consistent out-of-court statement offered as substantive
evidence for rebuttal under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) must have been made
before the alleged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
emerged.54

52

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee note (“Under the rule they are
substantive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the
stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence,
no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”).
54
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995); see also Gov’t of the V.I. v.
Muiruri, 340 F. App’x 794, 797 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court squarely
addressed the pre-motive requirement in Tome v. United States, stating: ‘Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to
bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited.’ The question is whether
an out-of-court statement rebuts the alleged link between the declarant’s purported
motive to lie and her subsequent testimony. The pre-motive requirement exists because
‘[a] consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that
the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive . . . [but] out-of-court
statements that postdate the alleged fabrication . . . refute the charged fabrication in a
less direct and forceful way.’ This distinction is necessary because ‘[i]f . . . Rule
[801(d)(1)(B)] were to permit the introduction of prior statements as substantive
evidence to rebut every implicit charge that a witness’ in-court testimony results from
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, the whole emphasis of the trial
could shift to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones.’”) (citations omitted);
United States v. Frazier, 469 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has
imputed a ‘premotive’ requirement into Rule 801(d)(1)(B), so that statements are only
admissible under the rule ‘when those statements were made before the charged recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive.’ The purpose of this requirement is that,
in most instances, a consistent statement that predates the motive is more likely to be
truthful than a prior consistent statement made after the motive to fabricate arose. . . .
In this sense, the premotive requirement reflects the common law temporal requirement
that any motive to fabricate must have arisen after the prior consistent statement in
order for the statement to be admissible.”) (citations omitted).
53
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The adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i), however, did not replace the
common law rule that prior consistent statements could be used to
rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility.55 It merely added another possible
and different use for these statements—substantive proof of the consistent
statement’s assertions.56
There are critical differences between the requirements for admission
of a prior consistent statement for substantive, versus credibility,
purposes. For substantive purposes, the declarant must testify and be
subjected to cross examination about the prior statement.57 For rehabilitation purposes, this is not required—the court may admit the declarant’s
out-of-court consistent statement even if the declarant does not testify
and is not cross-examined.58 Next for substantive purposes, counsel may
offer the out-of-court consistent statement by the declarant-witness to
rebut a cross-examiner’s claim that the declarant recently fabricated the
out-of-court statement he testified to on direct examination, or made that
statement because of a recent improper influence or motive.59 According
to several courts, the rehabilitation purpose does not.60 Following this
55

Richter, supra note 48, at 951.
United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005).
57
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
58
United States v. Cotton, 823 F.3d 430,437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 520
(2016).
59
Ellis, 121 F.3d at 919 (citing Tome, 513 U.S. at 156); accord United States. v.
Beaulieu, 194 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 517
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 67 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), aff’d on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
60
See United States v. Adams, 63 M.J. 691, 696 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (explaining that prior statements are relevant for rehabilitation and context); United States v.
Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) (“‘[W]here prior consistent statements are
not offered for their truth but for the limited purpose of rehabilitation, . . . Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and its concomitant restrictions do not apply.’”) (quoting Ellis, 121 F.3d
at 919); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988) (Such use is in
accord with the “doctrine of completeness,” which provides that “[t]he opponent,
against whom a part of an utterance has been put in, may in his turn complement it by
putting in the remainder, in order to secure for the tribunal a complete understanding
of the total tenor and effect of the utterance.”) (quoting 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2113, p. 653 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Pierre, 781 F.2d at 331 (noting that statements “offered to clarify or
amplify the meaning of the impeaching inconsistent statement” have significant
rebutting force); Rubin, 609 F.2d at 70 (Friendly, J., concurring) (arguing that use of
prior consistent statements for rehabilitation should be generously allowed “since they
bear on whether, looking at the whole picture, there was any real inconsistency”).
56
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logic, then the requirement in Tome v. United States61 that a declarant’s
consistent out-of-court statements could only be admitted when those out-of-court statements were made before the claimed recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive is also inapplicable.62 Nevertheless, prior
consistent statements for the purpose of rehabilitation “still must meet
at least the standard of having ‘some rebutting force beyond the mere fact
that the witness repeated on a prior occasion a statement consistent with
his trial testimony.’”63
In 2014, the Federal Rules of Evidence expanded the non-hearsay
category of consistent statements used to rehabilitate the declarantwitness’s credibility.64 Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) announces that an out-ofcourt statement is not hearsay if a declarant testifies and is subject to
cross examination; the declarant’s prior out-of-court statement is
consistent with the declarant’s current testimony; and the statement is
offered to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility, after the declarant’s
credibility has been attacked on a ground other than recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive.65 These additional grounds of impeachment may include cross-examination on the witness’s prior inconsistent
statement or failure to recall,66 as well as the witness’s bias, interest,
corruption, coercion, contradicting statements, or inability to perceive,
narrate or recall the event about which he has testified.67
Consequently, the party offering the rehabilitating consistent statement
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) may use it for a substantive purpose—to
prove the declarant’s assertions within the out-of-court statement.68 The
61

513 U.S. 150 (1995).
Ellis, 121 F.3d at 919; Tome, 513 U.S. at 156 (1995); accord Richter, supra note
48, at 940 (“Following a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive or influence,
a ‘premotive’ prior consistent statement by the witness may be admitted to rehabilitate
and for its truth. In contrast, prior consistent statements made by the witness after the
inception of the improper motive may never be used for their truth.”).
63
Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 27-28 (citing Pierre, 781 F.2d at 331); accord United
States v. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (restating Simonelli quotation).
64
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee note to 2014 amendment.
65
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii).
66
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee note to 2014 amendment.
67
See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
68
Berry v. Beauvais, No. 13-cv-2647-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 5244892, at *2 (D.
Colo. Sept. 9, 2015) (“Before December 1, 2014, a prior consistent statement could be
62
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amendment retains the Tome requirement that a consistent statement
“offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive, must have been made before the alleged fabrication or improper
influence or motive arose.”69 This amendment simply expands the use
of consistent statements for substantive purposes to rehabilitate the
credibility of the witness from other attacks.
The amendment does not permit the introduction of consistent
statements to bolster the witness’s credibility70 nor to merely add facts
or expand the witness’s trial testimony.71 As before, under this amendment a party may only introduce prior consistent statements to rehabilitate a witness’s credibility after an opponent has attacked it.72 The court
may admit prior consistent statements under this amended rule only if
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted if it was ‘consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and [was] offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so
testifying.’ Effective December 1, 2014, however, subparagraph (B) was split into two
clauses: ‘(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated
it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or (ii) to
rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground[.]’
. . . Understanding this new clause requires understanding the overall purpose of Rule
801(d)(1)(B). From the beginning, this Rule was not intended to ensure admissibility
of prior consistent statements. Such statements had ‘traditionally . . . been admissible
to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.’ Rule
801(d)(1)(B) was not intended to change that. Rather, the purpose of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
was to expand the use of such statements, admitting them not only as pure rehabilitative evidence but also as substantive evidence—i.e., evidence of the truth of the
matter asserted. According to the committee commentary on the most recent amendment, clause (ii) addresses prior consistent statements offered for purposes other than
to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, such as ‘consistent statements that are probative
to explain what otherwise appears to be an inconsistency in the witness’s testimony’
and ‘consistent statements that would be probative to rebut a charge of faulty memory.’
The committee saw that the Rule, as originally written, left these sorts of prior consistent statements ‘potentially admissible only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating
a witness’s credibility,’ not as substantive evidence. Clause (ii) clarifies that such
statements may be treated as substantive evidence.”) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
69
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee note to 2014 amendment.
70
Id.
71
Kirkpatrick & Mueller, supra note 49, at 193 (discussing the 2014 amendment
to Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) and its anticipated effect on the admission
into evidence of prior consistent statements).
72
For a critique of the new rule, see generally Kirkpatrick, & Mueller, supra note
49.
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the statements “properly rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been
attacked.”73 The only difference now is that after counsel attacks a
witness’s credibility on another ground, the court may admit the witness’s consistent out-of-court statements for substantive, as well as
credibility rehabilitation, purposes.74

V. The Complexities of
Federal Rule of Evidence 806
and Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)
The Federal Rules of Evidence challenge many attorneys and judges.
Rules 806 and 801(d)(1)(B) are particularly problematic. Two recent
cases highlight the complexities of Rule 806 and Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i)
and (ii).

A. United States v. Cotton75
In January 2013, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
investigated and ultimately arrested Jeremy Poe for cocaine trafficking.76
After Poe’s arrest, he agreed to cooperate with the DEA.77 Poe told the
DEA agents that he had received the cocaine from David Frazier.78 Poe
also implicated Torrance Cotton as the source of the drugs.79

73

Berry, 2015 WL 5244892, at *2 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee
note to 2014 amendment).
74
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee note to 2014 amendment. For a detailed
discussion of the 2014 Amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), see generally Vanderslice,
supra note 49 (critiquing the amendment to Rule 801(D)(1)(B)); see also Richter,
supra note 48, at 937 (stating the purpose of the article as finding a “constructive path
forward by highlighting the beneficial purposes of the proposed amendment [to Rule
801(d)(1)(B)] and exploring criticisms levied against it.”).
75
823 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 520 (2016).
76
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 432.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 433.
79
Id.
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Poe’s cooperation with the agents led to Frazier’s arrest.80 One
kilogram of cocaine was seized from Frazier’s home.81 After Frazier’s
arrest on January 18, 2013, Frazier told the interviewing police officer
that Torrance Cotton was the source of the cocaine.82 Cotton was later
arrested and charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession
with intent to distribute cocaine.83
At trial, the Government called cooperating co-conspirator Jeremy Poe
to testify against Torrance Cotton.84 Poe testified on direct examination
that Cotton’s co-conspirator, David Frazier, had told Poe before Frazier’s
January 2013 arrest that Cotton was the source of the cocaine they were
selling.85 The trial court admitted into evidence Frazier’s out-of-court
statements to Poe as non-hearsay co-conspirator statements under Rule
801(d)(2)(E).86 As such, these statements were substantive proof of the
drug conspiracy between Poe, Frazier and Cotton.87
Because of the admission of Frazier’s out-of-court statement,
even though he did not testify at trial, Frazier’s credibility was an
issue.88 Pursuant to Rule 806, Cotton attempted to impeach Frazier’s
credibility with an inconsistent statement in a July 2013 affidavit that
Frazier had provided to Cotton’s attorney several months after Frazier’s

80

Id.
Id.
82
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 435-36.
83
Id. at 433.
84
Id. at 435.
85
Id. at 435-36.
86
Id. at 436.
87
Id. (noting that introduction of Frazier’s out of-court co-conspirator statements
did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the statements were
not “testimonial”); see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (Testimonial statements are “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” . . . “extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions,” . . . “statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 435.
81
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January 2013 arrest.89 In part, Frazier’s affidavit stated, “I never had any
drug involvement with Mr. Cotton at all . . . .”90 Pursuant to Rule 806,
the court permitted Cotton’s defense counsel to impeach the absent
declarant, Frazier, with his inconsistent subsequent sworn statement.91
Following this impeachment of Frazier’s credibility through this
inconsistent statement, the Government sought to rehabilitate Frazier’s
credibility by introducing Frazier’s January 2013 post-arrest statement
to the interviewing officer.92 This earlier post-arrest statement concerning
Cotton’s involvement in the drug conspiracy was consistent with
Frazier’s pre-arrest co-conspirator statement to Poe, which, under Rule
801(d)(2)(E), the Government had introduced on direct examination.93
The defense objected to the introduction of this consistent statement,
arguing that Frazier’s post-arrest statement was inadmissible.94 The
defense argued that only Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) permitted the admission
of a witness’s prior consistent statement and only as non-hearsay
substantive evidence when opposing counsel had claimed that the witness
had recently fabricated his testimony or testified because of an improper
motive.95
The trial court disagreed and permitted the admission of Frazier’s
consistent post-arrest statement.96 Following Cotton’s conviction on
April 3, 2014, defense counsel raised this issue on appeal.97
To understand the “consistent statement” issues in this case, it is
helpful to diagram the sequence of the relevant Cotton trial testimony:

89

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
91
Id. at 436.
92
Id. at 435.
93
Id. at 435-36 (Appealing this admission, Cotton first argued that his Sixth
Amendment Right to Confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted
Frazier’s post-arrest statement. The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected this argument
because the Government offered Frazier’s post-arrest statement only as credibility
rehabilitation evidence and not as substantive non-hearsay evidence.).
94
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 436.
95
Id. at 436-37.
96
Id. at 437.
97
Id.
90
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed the admissibility of the
following out-of-court statements by Frazier, the declarant who did not
testify at trial: (1) Frazier’s pre-January 2013 statement to co-operating
witness Poe that Cotton was the source of the drugs, (2) Frazier’s July
2013 affidavit which stated that he never had any drug involvement with
Cotton, and (3) Frazier’s January 2013 post-arrest statement to the

16
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arresting officer concerning Cotton’s involvement in the drug conspiracy.98
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the trial court that all three statements
were admissible.99 Frazier’s pre-January 2013 statement to Poe qualified
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as a co-conspirator statement and, therefore,
could be considered as substantive evidence of Cotton’s participation in
the drug conspiracy.100 Frazier’s statement in the July 2013 affidavit
qualified under Rule 806 as proper impeachment of Frazier, the nontestifying declarant, through an inconsistent statement.101 It was the last
statement—Frazier’s consistent January 13, 2013 post-arrest statement—that the Court analyzed closely.102
The appellate court recognized there are two ways counsel could seek
to admit a declarant’s consistent statement made before declarant’s
inconsistent statement. The first is under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i), as nonhearsay substantive evidence offered to rebut a claim of recent fabrication
or improper motive. The second is as rehabilitation-credibility evidence,
after opposing counsel had impeached the declarant, here Frazier, with
an inconsistent statement.103 A quick review of the case makes it clear
that Frazier’s consistent statement could not have been admitted under
Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) because the Government could not satisfy the
requirements under that rule.104 Frazier, the declarant, never testified at
trial and he was not subjected to cross-examination by the defense.105
Nonetheless, the trial court admitted Frazier’s post-arrest consistent
statement to the police officer.106 The court stressed that the Government
offered this consistent statement for rehabilitation purposes—in response

98

Id. at 436.
Id. at 436, 438.
100
Cotton, 823, F.3d at 436.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 437.
104
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (stating that a declarant-witness’s prior statement
may only be admitted if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross examination about
the prior statement).
105
Id.
106
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 435-36.
99
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to defense counsel’s Rule 806 impeachment of Frazier.107 The language
of Rule 806 is explicit that a declarant’s credibility may be supported
after it has been attacked.108 As the Eighth Circuit declared: “Pursuant
to Rule 806, Frazier’s credibility was ‘attacked, and [could] then [be]
supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes
if [he] had testified as a witness.’”109 As long as the prior consistent
statements were not “merely cumulative” of the witness’s testimony,
these consistent statements could be introduced to explain the declarant’s
direct testimony or inconsistent statement.110
The Eighth Circuit stressed that it is within the court’s discretion
whether to admit a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate the witness’s
credibility.111 Although the trial court did not specify the grounds for
admitting Frazier’s consistent out-of-court statement, the Eighth Circuit
nevertheless found that the trial court did not err in permitting its
admission.112
It is difficult to understand the basis for admitting Frazier’s consistent
statement. The Eighth Circuit recognized that Frazier’s consistent
statement was not admitted to either explain or clarify Frazier’s other outof-court statements.113 Moreover, the consistent statement was not
admitted to rebut a claim that Frazier’s memory was faulty because it
does not appear that defense counsel ever made that claim.114 The
Government could not claim that it offered the consistent statement to
prove that the prior inconsistent statement in the July 2013 affidavit was
never made.115 The signed affidavit eliminated that possibility.116 It
appears that the court admitted Frazier’s consistent statement to the
arresting officer to rebut defense counsel’s inference that Frazier’s non-

107

Id. at 436.
FED. R. EVID. 806.
109
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 437.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 438.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 436-37.
115
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 435.
116
Id.
108
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hearsay, co-conspirator statements were untrue or never made.117 This
is problematic, however, because Frazier made the challenged consistent
statement after his arrest, at a time when Frazier would likely implicate
others in order to curry favor from the Government.118 It is difficult to
understand how this would “rehabilitate” Frazier’s credibility after it was
impeached with a signed affidavit he provided six months after his postarrest statement.119
Although defense counsel argued that Frazier’s consistent out-of-court
statements could only be admitted if they predated Frazier’s motive to
fabricate, the court disagreed.120 In a footnote the court explained that this
prerequisite is only required when counsel is seeking to admit the
consistent statement as substantive-rebuttal, not rehabilitation-credibility,
evidence.121 Although accurate, this distinction seems highly problematic.
It upholds an inconsistent, and somewhat irrational, approach to rehabilitation with a consistent statement by requiring that for a non-hearsay
substantive purpose under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i), the consistent statement
must predate the declarant’s motive to fabricate, while the rehabilitationcredibility purpose under the federal common law does not.122 It is
challenging to understand how a post-motive-to-lie consistent statement
truly rehabilitates a witness’s credibility after counsel has attacked that
credibility with an inconsistent statement. Frazier’s post-arrest statement
seems merely to be a repetition of Frazier’s earlier alleged co-conspirator
statement to Poe.123 Because Frazier never testified, it is difficult, if not
117

Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 435.
119
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157 (1995) (“Prior consistent
statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the
witness merely because she has been discredited.”); Pierre, 781 F.2d at 331 (“Of
course, not every prior consistent statement has much force in rebutting the effect of
a prior inconsistent statement, and the issue ought to be whether the particular
consistent statement sought to be used has some rebutting force beyond the mere fact
that the witness has repeated on a prior occasion a statement consistent with his trial
testimony.”).
120
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 436 n.3.
121
Id.
122
Kirkpatrick & Mueller, supra note 49, at 197.
123
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 436 n.3; see Pierre, 781 F.2d at 331 (“Prior consistent
statements still must meet at least the standard of having ‘some rebutting force beyond
the mere fact that the witness has repeated on a prior occasion a statement consistent
118
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impossible, to determine his motives for providing the post-arrest
statement implicating Cotton. For that reason, it would have been
prudent to prohibit the admission of Frazier’s consistent post-arrest
statement.
In view of the trial court’s permissive and balanced evidentiary
rulings, the Eighth Circuit could not conclude that the trial court had
abused its discretion in admitting Frazier’s consistent post-arrest
statement.124 Because the trial court allowed Cotton’s attorney to
introduce Frazier’s entire July 2013 affidavit to explain Frazier’s earlier
post-arrest January 18, 2013 statement implicating Cotton, the jury heard
every statement both parties wanted the jury to consider. 125 The court
had admitted (1) Frazier’s substantive pre-arrest co-conspirator statements concerning Cotton’s involvement in the distribution of cocaine
through witness Poe; (2) Frazier’s inconsistent statement provided by way
of Frazier’s July 2013 affidavit; (3) Frazier’s January 18, 2013 consistent
statement to the arresting officer; and (4) Frazier’s full explanation for
his post-arrest January 2013 statement in the remainder of the July 2013
affidavit.126 The appellate court held that because the lower court admitted
all of these statements, the jury was able to fully consider the truth of
Frazier’s non-hearsay co-conspirator statement and the credibility of
Frazier through the inconsistent statements and explanation in the
affidavit and the consistent post-arrest statement.127
Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that it was to consider
Frazier’s out-of-court inconsistent and consistent statements solely to
evaluate Frazier’s credibility.128 Finally, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that because Cotton was permitted to introduce the full July 2013
with his trial testimony.”); Adams, 63 M.J. at 697 (“Consistency—without more—
neither rebuts a specific attack on a witness’ credibility nor offers any further
information to explain an apparent weakness. It simply establishes that the witness said
the same thing on a prior occasion. ‘Mere repeated telling of the same story is not
relevant to whether that story, when told at trial, is true.’ As has been said, ‘a lie often
repeated does not become the truth.’ Consequently, more than mere reiteration of the
same statement is required for a statement to be relevant, and, therefore admissible.”)
(citation omitted).
124
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 438.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 438.
128
Id.

20

A MERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL A DVOCACY

[Vol. 41:1

affidavit—all the evidence he sought to admit on this issue—and because
Frazier’s post-arrest statement was not much different or more harmful
than Frazier’s admissible co-conspirator statements, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.129
In a rather mild understatement, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
remarked that this case provides “somewhat complex and unusual
circumstances.”130 In this “complex and unusual” case, however, there
are some critical points for lawyers to consider. First, once an attorney
impeaches a non-testifying declarant’s out-of-court statement with a prior
inconsistent statement pursuant to Rule 806, that attorney has opened the
door for opposing counsel to introduce the declarant’s prior consistent
statements to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility. This is true even
though the declarant has never testified. Moreover, as was the case here,
if the court admits the prior consistent statement simply to rehabilitate
the declarant’s credibility, and not as substantive evidence, the declarant’s
out-of-court consistent statements do not have to predate any motive to
fabricate.
Next, it is important to consider the following—Rule 806 allows an
attack on a non-testifying declarant’s credibility as if the declarant had
actually testified.131 The advisory notes to Rule 806 announce that
because “[t]he declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in
evidence is in effect a witness[,] [h]is credibility should in fairness be
subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact testified.”132
It is an open question whether opposing counsel could argue, and a court
could find, that the absent declarant had constructively “testified” and
had been “cross-examined” under Rule 806 and therefore had also
satisfied the testimonial requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) or (ii).
This “complex and unusual” case presents an evidentiary challenge
for attorneys and judges. It is questionable how many jurors would
understand the difference between substantive and impeachment evidence
in this complicated scenario.133 It is laudable that the prosecutor and

129

Id.
Cotton, 823 F.3d at 438.
131
FED. R. EVID. 806.
132
FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee note.
133
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 171 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Juries
have trouble distinguishing between the rehabilitative and substantive use of the kind
130
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defense counsel understood the point of each statement in this intricate
chain of evidence,134 but it is highly unlikely that even with a limiting
instruction, the jurors could differentiate between the impeachment and
rehabilitation of credibility, rather than the substantive non-hearsay,
purpose of this consistent statement evidence.135

B. United States v. Ledbetter136
In October 2014, Robert Ledbetter, along with seventeen co-defendants, was charged with multiple felonies including racketeering,
conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering, murder through the use of a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, conspiracy to
murder a witness, and use and discharge of a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence.137 During trial, the Government called
Latonia Boyce and Ashley Ward as witnesses against the defendants.138
In cross-examination, defense counsel sought to impeach these witnesses
with evidence of their previous convictions, previous inconsistent
statements and bias in favor of the prosecution in order to benefit from
the Government’s offer of leniency.139
of prior consistent statements listed in Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Judges may give instructions
limiting the use of such prior consistent statements to a rehabilitative purpose, but, in
practice, juries nonetheless tend to consider them for their substantive value.”); accord
Vanderslice, supra note 49, at 174-75 (discussing the shortcomings of limiting instructions that accompany prior consistent statements offered into evidence for rehabilitation); accord Richter, supra note 48, at 967 (discussing the confusion generated by
limiting instructions for prior consistent statements offered into evidence for rehabilitation).
134
Vanderslice, supra note 49, at 174-75 (“Some judges complain that even lawyers
do not understand when prior statements are admitted for rehabilitation but not their
truth. Meanwhile other judges simply do not entertain arguments that there is a
distinction.”).
135
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring);
see generally David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65
STAN. L. REV. 407 (2013) (arguing that widely-held misconceptions regarding
evidentiary instructions should be abandoned in favor of of the idea that limiting
instructions not only work but they are necessary for juror understanding).
136
184 F. Supp. 3d 594 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
137
United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:14-CR-127, 2014 WL 10297339, at *15-31
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2014).
138
Ledbetter, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 596-98.
139
Id. at 596.
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Not surprisingly, after this impeachment the Government attempted
to rehabilitate the credibility of these witnesses through third parties by
eliciting previous consistent statements made to them by these impeached
witnesses.140 The trial court commented, “[b]ecause these issues continue
to arise in this trial, and because the scope of the newly enacted Rule
80(d)(1)(B)(ii) remains somewhat of a mystery to courts and commentators,” the trial court issued a written order on two evidentiary objections.141 In an attempt to dispel this mystery, analysis of these evidentiary
objections follows.

1. Michael Boyd’s Prior Consistent Statements
Michael Boyd testified in the Government’s case-in-chief about
Ledbetter’s hostility towards one of the victims, Rodriccos Williams,
because Williams had married Ledbetter’s former girlfriend, Latonia
Boyce.142 Numerous defense counsel cross-examined Boyce about
Ledbetter’s autumn 2007 visit to a nightclub and the statements Boyd
later made to Latonia Boyce about Ledbetter’s threats of harm to her
husband, Williams.143 Defense counsel sought to impeach Boyd by
implying that Boyd had fabricated his trial testimony about Ledbetter’s
alleged threats in order to gain favor from the Government in the form
of possible termination of Boyd’s probation, expungement of his criminal
record, and eventual relocation to a new home.144
The Government later called witness Latonia Boyce, the wife of
murder victim Rodriccos Williams.145 Boyce was at home when four
individuals broke in to her home and killed her husband.146 Boyce
testified on direct examination to what she witnessed that night.147

140

Id.
Id.
142
Id. at 597.
143
Id.
144
Ledbetter, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 597.
145
Id. at 596.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 596.
141
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The prosecutor then tried to elicit testimony from Boyce about
Michael Boyd’s report to her of Ledbetter’s threats of harm to Boyce’s
husband, Rodriccos Williams.148 Defense counsel objected on the
grounds of hearsay.149 The Government countered that, pursuant to Rule
801(d)(1)(B)(i), Boyd’s out-of-court prior statements to Boyce were not
hearsay.150 Rather, they were prior statements that were consistent with
Boyd’s earlier trial testimony.151 The Government was offering these
consistent statements to rebut a charge by defense counsel that Boyd had
fabricated his testimony about these threats because of an improper
influence or motive.152
The court noted that Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) required the following
criteria to find a consistent out-of-court statement is not hearsay:
(1) The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about
the prior statement.
(2) The prior statement is consistent with the declarant’s in-court
testimony.
(3) The prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge that the declarant recently fabricated his testimony or
acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.
(4) The prior statement was made before any supposed motive to lie
arose.153
Here the court found that all four criteria existed.154 First, on direct
examination, Boyd testified about Ledbetter’s threats to harm Williams
before Williams’s 2007 murder.155 Defense counsel cross-examined
Boyd about his out-of-court statements to Boyce concerning Ledbetter’s
threats toward Williams.156 Second, the statements about which the
148

Id.
Id.
150
Ledbetter, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 596.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 597.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Ledbetter, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 597.
149
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Government asked Boyce were consistent with Boyd’s earlier trial
testimony about Ledbetter’s hostility and threats towards Williams.157
Third, the Government introduced Boyd’s consistent statements to Boyce
to rebut the defense charge through its impeachment of Boyd that Boyd
had fabricated his trial testimony about these alleged threats in order to
curry favor from the Government for Boyd’s own criminal problems.158
Finally, Boyd’s prior consistent statement predated any communication
with the Government.159 Significantly, Boyd spoke to law enforcement
in 2009, two years after Williams’s murder in 2007.160 On the other hand,
Boyd made the statements to Boyce soon after Williams’s murder in
November 2007.161 Consequently, the Government argued that Boyd
made the statements about Ledbetter’s threats well before Boyd talked
to law enforcement and “well before any alleged improper motive
influence or motive” on Boyd’s part to curry favor from the Government
could have arisen.162
The trial court found that Boyd’s 2007 statements to Boyce about
Ledbetter’s threats to harm Williams met the criteria under Rule
801(d)(1)(B)(i).163 As such the statements were admissible as substantive,
non-hearsay evidence, which the Government could use to prove that
Ledbetter had threatened to harm Williams.164 Moreover, because these
out-of-court statements were substantive evidence of Ledbetter’s threats
to harm Williams, the court was not required to instruct the jury to limit
its consideration of this evidence solely for impeachment purposes.165
Interestingly the court found it was insignificant that the Government
elicited Boyd’s consistent statements from Boyce rather than Boyd.166
As long as Boyd had already testified on direct examination about

157

Id.
Id.
159
Id. at 598.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Ledbetter, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 598.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 597 n.1.
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Ledbetter’s threats to harm Williams and defense counsel had crossexamined Boyd about those prior statements, it was inconsequential that
the Government sought to elicit Boyd’s earlier consistent statements from
witness Boyce, rather than from declarant Boyd himself.167 This finding
is consistent with the decisions of other courts.168

2. Ashley Ward’s Prior Consistent Statements
The Government also called Ashley Ward as a prosecution witness
in its case-in-chief.169 Ward had a relationship with co-defendant
Rastaman Wilson, who had died before trial.170 Wilson had allegedly told
Ward details about an underlying offense in this case—the 2007 murder
of Donathan Moon.171 On cross-examination defense counsel sought to
impeach Ward by eliciting testimony that although Ward had information
about Moon’s murder in August 2007, Ward did not share this informa167

Id.
See United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that prior
consistent statements of declarant can be proffered through any witness with personal
knowledge of the statement pursuant to rule 801(d)(1)(B)); accord United States v.
Green, 258 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not bar the
introduction of a prior consistent statement through the testimony of someone other
than the declarant, so long as the declarant is available for cross-examination about the
statement at some time during trial.”); United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (“We therefore hold that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not bar introduction
of the prior consistent statement through a witness other than the declarant.”); United
States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that statements from a third
party regarding declarant’s prior consistent statements admissible under rule
801(d)(1)(B)); United States. v. Griggs, 735 F.2d 1318, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The
court admitted Viel's testimony as being non-hearsay.”); United States v. Dominguez,
604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating “[r]ule 801(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides that a prior consistent statement of a person who has testified and
who has been subject to cross-examination is ‘not hearsay’ and is admissible if it ‘is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive.’”); United States v. Roye, No. 3:15-cr-29 (JBA), 2016
WL 4147133, at *1 n.1 (D. Conn. 2016) (“The prior consistent statement need not be
proffered through the testimony of the declarant but may be proffered through any
witness who has firsthand knowledge of the statement.”); MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Patriarch
Partners VIII, LLC, 2012 WL 2568972, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“These documents are
prior consistent statements and admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).”).
169
Ledbetter, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 598.
170
Id.
171
Id.
168
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tion until after the 2011 arrest of her boyfriend, Rastaman Wilson.172
Defense counsel intended to show that Ward had merely provided this
information to gain leniency for her boyfriend.173
The Government later called as a witness Captain Chris Barbuto, the
lead investigator for the Moon murder.174 Barbuto testified about the
Moon murder investigation and the role Ward played in it when she came
forward with her information.175 The Government then sought to
introduce Ward’s statements to Barbuto about the 2007 Moon murder,
which were consistent with her trial testimony.176 Defense counsel
objected again on the grounds of hearsay.177 The Government argued
once again that, under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i), these out-of-court statements
were not hearsay because the consistent statements were being offered
to rebut the defense’s argument that Ward had fabricated her testimony
to gain benefits for her boyfriend.178 Moreover, they were not hearsay
under the newly adopted Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) because the Government
was seeking to rehabilitate Ward’s credibility after being attacked on
another ground.179 The Government, however, did not specify those other
grounds.180
The court reiterated the four criteria that were required under Rule
801(d)(1)(B)(i) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) to rule that a consistent out-ofcourt statement is not hearsay.181 The Government satisfied some, but
not all, of the required criteria.182 Declarant Ashley Ward did testify that
Wilson had told her about the murder of Donathan Moon, and defense
counsel cross-examined her about those statements.183 Ward’s prior
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statement to Captain Barbuto was consistent with her in-court testimony
and the Government offered it to rebut a charge that Ward, the declarant,
was offering her testimony because of a recent improper influence—
helping her boyfriend Rastaman Wilson.184 The court ruled, however,
that the prior consistent statement was not admissible as non-hearsay
because Ward did not make it before any supposed motive to lie arose.185
During cross-examination of Ward, defense counsel attacked Ward’s
credibility on “the ground[s] of recent fabrication or improper influence.”186 Counsel argued that Ward provided information about the
Moon murder solely to gain leniency for her recently arrested boyfriend.187 Nonetheless, the court found that under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i)
the Government could not introduce Ward’s consistent out-of-court
statements to law enforcement because those consistent statements did
not predate her alleged improper motive of seeking to help her arrested
boyfriend.188 As the court declared, “When a declarant-witness or, in this
instance, their loved one is arrested and then the witness begins cooperating with authorities by sharing information with them—the motivation
to lie arises before the ‘prior consistent statement’ in question is made.”189
In other words, for non-hearsay substantive purposes, the declarant must
make the prior consistent statement before the motive to fabricate
arose.190
Furthermore the court found that newly adopted Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii)
did not apply here because that rule applies “only to prior consistent
statements [which are] offered ‘to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility
. . . on another ground.’”191 The Government failed to argue that it was
seeking to offer Ward’s consistent out-of-court statements to Captain
Barbuto for another reason.192 Consequently, the court concluded that
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the amended rule was inapplicable here, and prohibited testimony about
Ms. Ward’s prior consistent statements to Captain Barbuto.193 The trial
court admitted Michael Boyd’s consistent statement but excluded Ashley
Ward’s consistent statement.194
It is important to note that if the prosecutor in this case had followed
the lead of the prosecutor in United States v. Cotton195 and argued that
he was not seeking to introduce Ward’s prior consistent statement as nonhearsay substantive evidence, the prosecutor may have succeeded in
admitting Ward’s consistent statement. The prosecutor could have argued
that he was simply using Ward’s prior consistent statement to rehabilitate
Ward’s credibility after defense counsel attacked it by implying that Ward
lied to the police to curry favor for her arrested boyfriend. In Cotton, the
court seemed to suggest that this was acceptable if the Government was
simply offering the consistent statement to rehabilitate the witness’s
credibility and not as substantive evidence of the consistent statement’s
assertions.

Conclusion
Like many Rules of Evidence, Rules 806, 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) are
complex. Unless counsel is fully familiar with all the requirements and
consequences of these rules, it is easy for counsel to be confused and
ultimately derailed by them. Although an attorney may intend simply
to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement or a claim of
bias, that attorney may very well open the door to the admission of
damaging consistent out-of-court statements by the witness. Even if a
declarant does not testify, if counsel attacks the declarant’s credibility
on cross-examination, then opposing counsel may succeed in introducing
prior consistent statements to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility.
Furthermore, although an out-of-court statement should not be admitted

193
Id. at 601 (quoting United States v. Kubini, No. 11-14, 2015 WL 418220, at *9
(W.D.Pa. Feb. 2, 2015) (“Where, as here, defense counsel does not open the door to
further rehabilitation through use of ‘other attacks on a witness—such as the charges
of inconsistency or faulty memory,’ Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) has no role to play.”)).
194
Id.
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823 F.3d 430, 437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 520 (2016).
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under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) or (ii), if counsel is not fully familiar with
these intricate rules and fails to object, an opponent may successfully
admit a damaging prior consistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i)
or (ii) as substantive evidence of the statement’s assertion. Moreover,
counsel must also be aware that counsel may use these prior consistent
statements in two possible and potentially damaging ways: as
rehabilitation-credibility evidence, as in United States v. Cotton, or as
substantive-non hearsay evidence as in United States v. Ledbetter.
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